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Add db-plan-enabled recommendation (#588)

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* fix broken links
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Steve Chavez
2023-01-28 20:20:48 -05:00
committed by GitHub
parent 8be87ed4ac
commit 082b418334
3 changed files with 27 additions and 4 deletions
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docs/auth.rst
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@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ For PostgreSQL server version >= 14
.. code:: sql
current_setting('request.jwt.claims', true)::json->>'email';
For PostgreSQL server version < 14
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ JWT security
There are at least three types of common critiques against using JWT: 1) against the standard itself, 2) against using libraries with known security vulnerabilities, and 3) against using JWT for web sessions. We'll briefly explain each critique, how PostgREST deals with it, and give recommendations for appropriate user action.
The critique against the `JWT standard <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7519>`_ is voiced in detail `elsewhere on the web <https://paragonie.com/blog/2017/03/jwt-json-web-tokens-is-bad-standard-that-everyone-should-avoid>`_. The most relevant part for PostgREST is the so-called :code:`alg=none` issue. Some servers implementing JWT allow clients to choose the algorithm used to sign the JWT. In this case, an attacker could set the algorithm to :code:`none`, remove the need for any signature at all and gain unauthorized access. The current implementation of PostgREST, however, does not allow clients to set the signature algorithm in the HTTP request, making this attack irrelevant. The critique against the standard is that it requires the implementation of the :code:`alg=none` at all.
The critique against the `JWT standard <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7519>`_ is voiced in detail `elsewhere on the web <https://web.archive.org/web/20230123041631/https://paragonie.com/blog/2017/03/jwt-json-web-tokens-is-bad-standard-that-everyone-should-avoid>`_. The most relevant part for PostgREST is the so-called :code:`alg=none` issue. Some servers implementing JWT allow clients to choose the algorithm used to sign the JWT. In this case, an attacker could set the algorithm to :code:`none`, remove the need for any signature at all and gain unauthorized access. The current implementation of PostgREST, however, does not allow clients to set the signature algorithm in the HTTP request, making this attack irrelevant. The critique against the standard is that it requires the implementation of the :code:`alg=none` at all.
Critiques against JWT libraries are only relevant to PostgREST via the library it uses. As mentioned above, not allowing clients to choose the signature algorithm in HTTP requests removes the greatest risk. Another more subtle attack is possible where servers use asymmetric algorithms like RSA for signatures. Once again this is not relevant to PostgREST since it is not supported. Curious readers can find more information in `this article <https://auth0.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-json-web-token-libraries/>`_. Recommendations about high quality libraries for usage in API clients can be found on `jwt.io <https://jwt.io/>`_.